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The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in 











Recent theoretical literature has debated the desirability of permitting debtors to 
contract with lenders over control rights in bankruptcy. Proponents point to the 
monitoring benefits brought from concentrating control rights in the hands of a single 
lender. Detractors point to the costs imposed on other creditors by a senior claimant’s 
inadequate incentives to maximise net recoveries. The UK provides the setting for a 
natural experiment regarding these theories. Until recently, UK bankruptcy law 
permitted firms to give complete ex post control to secured creditors, through a 
procedure known as Receivership. Receivership was replaced in 2003 by a new 
procedure, Administration, which was intended to introduce greater accountability to 
unsecured creditors to the governance of bankrupt firms, through a combination of 
voting rights and fiduciary duties. We present empirical findings from a hand-coded 
sample of 340 bankruptcies from both before and after the change in the law, 
supplemented with qualitative interview data. We find robust evidence that whilst 
gross realisations have increased following the change in the law, these have tended to 
be eaten up by concomitantly increased bankruptcy costs. The net result has been that 
creditor recoveries have remained unchanged. This implies that dispersed and 
concentrated creditor governance in bankruptcy may be functionally equivalent.  
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The role played by secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings has recently 
become prominent in policy discussions. In the US, secured creditors have been 
exerting a growing influence over firms in bankruptcy (Baird and Rasmussen, 2002; 
Skeel, 2004; Ayotte and Morrison, 2008), sparking debate over the desirability of this 
development. At the same time, those formulating reform proposals for developing 
countries have begun to investigate the extent to which giving power to secured 
lenders, rather than courts, may be an effective way of overcoming limitations in 
judicial institutions (Safavian and Sharma, 2007; Djankov et al, 2008).  
As a theoretical matter, it has been argued that secured creditor control can 
provide a solution to collective action problems in bankruptcy (Picker, 1992; Armour 
and Frisby, 2001; Gennaioli and Rossi, 2008) and that consequently, it is desirable to 
permit firms to contract with their creditors over the allocation of control rights in 
bankruptcy (Rasmussen, 1992; Schwartz, 1998). Others, however, are strongly critical 
of such proposals, pointing to the possibilities for rent-seeking by those in control of 
such a process (LoPucki, 1999; Westbrook, 2004). 
Policy-makers in the UK have grappled with these issues in a recent 
bankruptcy reform, the results of which may have implications for these more general 
debates. Until recently, UK firms could opt to place control in bankruptcy 
proceedings in the hands of secured creditors. A creditor holding a ‘floating charge’ (a 
security interest similar to the UCC’s floating lien) had the right to appoint an 
administrative receiver, who had plenary powers to manage the debtor firm and yet 
owed fiduciary duties only to the secured creditor. This receivership system was 
perceived to lead to excessive liquidations and inflated bankruptcy costs, because 
senior claimants lack incentives to maximise recoveries and minimise costs in cases 
where the firm’s assets are worth more than the face value of the senior debt (Aghion 
et al, 2002). In response to these concerns, the UK’s Enterprise Act 2002 shifted 
power from secured to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.  
We present the results of the first systematic empirical comparison of the 
UK’s old and new bankruptcy regimes. We analyse a hand-coded sample of 340 
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bankruptcy cases, comprising 109 administrative receiverships commencing in 2001-
2003, 195 administrations commencing in 2003 and 2004, after the change in the 
law,1 and a smaller sample of 36 administrative receiverships commencing in 2003 
and 2004, after the change in the law. We find evidence that, as compared with 
administrative receivership, the new administration procedure tends to generate both 
higher gross asset realisations and higher direct costs, the results as to costs being the 
most robust. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the number of bankrupt 
firms that are kept open under the new regime. On this basis, it is quite plausible that 
any gains to creditors from increased realisations are eaten up in higher direct costs, 
implying a net reduction in welfare. We interpret these findings as casting doubt on 
strong theoretical claims for the superiority of one form of investor governance in 
bankruptcy proceedings over another. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
literature, explains the structure of UK corporate bankruptcy law (including the recent 
change) and formulates hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data. Results are 
presented in section 4, along with robustness checks, and section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of the implications.  
 
2. Literature review and formulation of hypotheses 
2.1 Theory 
When a firm becomes unable to pay its debts, its creditors become entitled to take 
control of its assets. A basic justification for bankruptcy procedures is that collective 
action problems between the creditors would lead to inefficient loss of 
complementarities between the firms’ assets if exercised on a purely individual basis 
(Jackson, 1986). Secured creditors have rights to payment from the sale of particular 
assets, as opposed to a claim against the debtor’s general assets. If secured creditors’ 
enforcement rights were not stayed in bankruptcy, then enforcement by multiple 
secured creditors would lead to inefficient liquidation (Webb, 1990). However, if a 
                                               
1
 The new law came into force on 15 September 2003. 
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single security interest is granted over the entirety of the company’s assets, then 
theory predicts that there should be no collective action problems ex post (Picker, 
1992). Thus whilst permitting multiple secured creditors to have control rights as 
regards individual complementary assets involves a coordination problem, permitting 
only a single creditor to do so against all the assets does not.2  
 Moreover, giving such control rights to a secured lender ex post can 
complement the monitoring functions a concentrated lender can provide during the 
life of the loan. All-encompassing secured credit facilitates control by the secured 
lender, especially when combined with revolving overdraft facilities and extensive 
loan covenants (Scott, 1986; Franks and Sussman, 2005; Baird and Rasmussen, 2006; 
Armour, 2006). Thus a concentrated secured lender is in a position to assist in keeping 
the debtor’s management under control (Triantis and Daniels, 1995; Baird and 
Rasmussen, 2002).   
 If a collective bankruptcy procedure is not mandatory, then the extent to which 
firms succeed in resolving creditor coordination problems will depend on the way its 
debt finance is structured. Some have argued that freedom of contract in this domain 
is likely to yield outcomes better tailored to the particular features of debtors than a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ mandatory procedure (Rasmussen, 1992; Schwartz, 1998; Gennaioli 
and Rossi, 2008). Others allege that such a contracting process would itself suffer 
from coordination failures, justifying a mandatory regime (LoPucki, 1999; 
Westbrook, 2004).   
 The issue has received little empirical attention, largely owing to the 
difficulties of comparability. A recent exception is Djankov et al (2008), who 
categorize insolvency procedures around the world into ‘reorganization’, involving a 
stay of all secured creditors, and ‘foreclosure’, connoting enforcement by a single 
secured creditor where all-encompassing security is permitted. Using survey evidence 
from practitioners concerning a hypothetical case study, they conclude that there may 
                                               
2
 There is hence an important ambiguity in measures of ‘creditor rights’ such as that constructed by La 
Porta et al (1998) which condition on whether or not secured creditors are stayed in bankruptcy without 
considering whether all-encompassing security interests are permitted.  
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be little to choose between these two types of procedure in terms of ex post efficiency. 
However, these results may be sensitive to the nature of the hypothetical employed.  
 
2.2 UK Bankruptcy Law  
Until recently, UK bankruptcy law did not impose a stay on the enforcement of 
secured claims. Instead it permitted a secured creditor holding an all-encompassing 
security interest—known in the UK as a ‘floating charge’—to enforce against the 
entirety of the debtor firm’s assets. The structure of firms’ lending agreements, and 
the security interests granted, are a matter for private contracts with their creditors. 
The market practice in the UK was for firms to enter into a relational lending 
agreement with a single bank, which would be granted a package of security interests 
such that enforcement would give it effective control over the entirety of the debtor’s 
assets (Armour and Frisby, 2001; Franks and Sussmann, 2005).3 In effect, the bank 
conducted a private liquidation, known as an ‘administrative receivership’ (or 
‘receivership’ for short). This contrasted starkly with US federal bankruptcy law, 
under which all secured creditors are stayed from enforcing during insolvency 
proceedings,4 although in recent years debtor-in-possession financing agreements 
have been used by secured creditors  to reassert control in Chapter 11 proceedings 
(Baird and Rasmussen, 2002; Skeel, 2004; Ayotte and Morrison, 2008). 
 Giving ex post control to a single secured creditor had the potential to give rise 
to conflicts of interest between the receiver auctioning the assets on the bank’s behalf 
and the junior creditors (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Finch, 
1999; Mokal, 2004). Where the value of the firm’s assets was greater than the amount 
of secured debt owed, then the secured creditor would not be the residual claimant and 
                                               
3
 The use of security in ‘relational’ lending arrangements was first posited by Scott (1986), who 
focused on its role in controlling financial agency costs during the life of the loan, as opposed to 
reducing enforcement costs ex post.  
4
 11 USC § 362. In Chapter 7, control of the bankrupt firm is transferred to a creditor-appointed 
Trustee, whereas in Chapter 11 the debtor’s management usually remain in control of the firm during 
the proceedings. 
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hence the receiver would not have strong incentives to maximise value. Some 
suggested that this would tend to induce inefficient liquidation, on the assumptions 
that a fire sale would be quicker than a going concern sale, and that oversecured banks 
would prefer their money as quickly as possible (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al, 
1992). It was also suggested that oversecured banks would have little incentive to 
monitor receivers, leading to inflated professional fees for the conduct of the 
receivership (Mokal, 2004). Of course, in cases where the value of the firm’s assets 
was less than the amount owed to the secured creditor (that is, the creditor was 
undersecured), the bank would be the residual claimant and the receiver would have 
appropriate incentives to maximise value (Armour and Frisby, 2001; Ayotte and 
Morrison, 2008).  
Another potential limitation of the receivership system was that it resulted 
only in auctions of assets, rather than reorganisations of corporate entities (Insolvency 
Service, 2001; Mokal, 2004). Whilst going-concern sales via an auction may in many 
cases be quicker and cheaper than reorganizations (Baird, 1986), if the economy is in 
a general downturn, then potential purchasers of distressed businesses (likely 
competitors) are themselves likely to be liquidity constrained, depressing prices that 
can be achieved in an auction (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).5  
The UK’s Enterprise Act 2002 introduced a package of reforms to bankruptcy 
law that were intended to correct the perceived problems with receivership 
(Insolvency Service, 2001). The entitlement of floating charge holders to appoint an 
administrative receiver was (with some limited exceptions) abolished. This change 
was prospective, applying only to floating charges created after the commencement of 
the legislation on 15 September 2003.  
Instead, floating charge holders were given the right to initiate a different type 
of insolvency procedure, administration. This procedure, which had first been 
introduced in 1985, differed from receivership in that there was a stay extending to 
                                               
5
 However, the extent to which it was really necessary to provide a mechanism for reorganisation as 
well as asset sales (whether on a going concern or piecemeal basis) was questionable, as many 
reorganisations are effected informally outside bankruptcy proceedings (Franks and Sussman, 2005).  
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secured as well as unsecured claims, and that the appointee, the ‘administrator’, was 
accountable to all the creditors. When originally introduced, administration had been 
intended to serve as a substitute for receivership in cases where there was no floating 
charge (Cork Commitee, 1982). In keeping with this ‘gap filling’ status, floating 
charge holders had been given a veto over the appointment of an administrator. 
Moreover, a court order was required to commence administration. As a consequence, 
administration had been used only infrequently (Insolvency Service, 2001). The 
Enterprise Act 2002 in effect forced holders of floating charges to use administration 
instead of receivership. At the same time, the requirement of a court order for 
appointment was abolished, meaning that the floating charge holder can now appoint 
an administrator as quickly as they formerly could appoint a receiver.  
Two mechanisms of accountability seek to ensure that the administrator 
considers the interests of the creditors as a whole, rather than just the secured creditor. 
First, the administrator must put proposals to a creditors’ meeting for a vote within 
eight to ten weeks of appointment.6 The vote is taken by the unsecured creditors, 
unless the administrator thinks that they will receive no recoveries, in which case 
secured creditors vote.7 This structure can be understood as seeking to ensure that 
voting power resides in the hands of the residual claimant. Of course, the correct 
identification of the residual claimant depends upon the administrator’s evaluation of 
the firm’s value at the commencement of formal proceedings.  
The second mechanism of accountability is the administrator’s legal duties. He 
owes duties to act in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole, to perform 
his functions as quickly and efficiently as possible, and is statutorily obliged to pursue 
                                               
6
 The proposals must be circulated within eight weeks, and the meeting must be held within ten weeks: 
UK Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 49, 51. 
7
 The default position is that no meeting need be held where the administrator considers that the 
unsecured creditors will not share in any recoveries; in this case the administrator is required simply to 
act in the interests of secured creditors, and a meeting is only called if requested by a creditor or 
creditors owed at least 10% of the company’s total debts (UK Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1, para 52; 
UK Insolvency Rules 1986, rr. 2.38, 2.40-42). 
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a hierarchy of objectives.8 The first two of these are, respectively, (i) the rescue of the 
company as a going concern; and (ii) the achievement of a better result for the 
company’s (unsecured) creditors than in liquidation. As between these, he must seek 
to do that which will yield the highest return for the (unsecured) creditors. In effect, 
he is legally obliged to seek to maximise the returns for the unsecured creditors—
either through a corporate reorganisation (objective (i)), where possible—or failing 
that, through any other technique (e.g. sale of the business as a going concern, or work 
through of existing contracts) that will yield more for the creditors than an immediate 
fire sale (objective (ii)). Where the administrator thinks that neither (i) nor (ii) is 
reasonably practicable, then he may seek instead to realise assets for the benefit of a 
secured creditor, provided that in so doing he does not unnecessarily harm the 
interests of unsecured creditors. In essence, this statutory hierarchy is, like the voting 
mechanisms, intended to ensure that the administrator has appropriate incentives to 
maximise returns ex post (Armour and Mokal, 2005).  
Doubts have been raised as to whether these new legal mechanisms of 
accountability will result in a significant improvement for unsecured creditors (Frisby, 
2004; Armour and Mokal, 2005). First, it should be noted that secured creditors still 
retain considerable control over the administration procedure. The floating charge 
holder is in most cases responsible for the selection and appointment of the 
administrator. Banks operate ‘panels’ for the selection of accountants to act as their 
insolvency practitioners, which impose reputational constraints on the latter’s’ 
actions: those appointees who take steps contrary to the banks’ interests in the course 
of an appointment may expect not to be appointed again. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, the new regime makes no provision for ‘statutory super-priority’ to be 
granted to those advancing funds to the bankrupt firm. Thus the company’s existing 
bankers retain control of funding during administration proceedings. This makes it 
difficult for an administrator, even if so minded, to achieve an outcome contrary to 
that desired by the secured creditor. 
                                               
8
 UK Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 3-4. 
 9 
 
2.3 Formulation of Hypotheses 
The change in UK law effected by the Enterprise Act 2002 may be summarised as 
follows: the secured creditor’s control of bankruptcy proceedings is reduced, in favour 
of increased control granted to unsecured claimants. This transfer is effected through 
two new mechanisms of accountability: (i) legal duties to all the creditors; (ii) the 
requirement for approval by a creditors’ meeting. We might expect these changes to 
have an impact on realisations and on costs of proceedings, and we now formulate 
hypotheses about the likely determinants of realisations and bankruptcy costs. To 
assist us in structuring our intuitions about the changes in practice, we conducted  
thirteen open-ended interviews with professionals involved in UK bankruptcy 
proceedings. Summary details of interview subjects are tabulated in Table 1, and 
relevant findings are identified at appropriate points in the text. 
 
2.3.1 Realisations 
The imposition of new governance mechanisms rendering the office-holder 
accountable to all the creditors might therefore be expected to result in increased 
recoveries, because the administrator would thereby have better incentives to 
maximise realisations. Whilst a number of our interview subjects stated that the 
change in the law would have little effect on the way in which bankruptcies were run, 
some insolvency practitioners did indicate that it would cause them to be more careful 
in thinking about how best to realise the assets.
 
Hypothesis 1: Realisations may be expected to be larger in administrations 
than in administrative receiverships.  
We would expect any such difference to be more pronounced in cases where the value 
of the bankrupt firm’s assets is more than the amount of secured debt. This is because, 
 10 
if the assets are worth less than the secured debt, then in a receivership, the secured 
creditor will have appropriate incentives to maximise value.9  
Hypothesis 1A:  The increase in realisations in administrations as compared 
to administrative receiverships may be most pronounced in cases where 
secured lenders are oversecured.  
 
2.3.2 Costs 
Types of bankruptcy cost 
The literature typically divides the costs of bankruptcy into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
components. Direct costs are the costs involved in running a procedure: that is, the 
fees paid to professionals such as lawyers, accountants, valuers, business consultants 
and marketing experts who are employed in realising the assets of the bankrupt firm 
and agreeing an appropriate distribution of the proceeds. These are relatively easy to 
observe, as most bankruptcy systems require that a record of such payments be kept in 
individual cases.  
Indirect costs encompass everything else. Ex post, they would include the 
costs of decisional error by the trustee realising the assets—that is, the costs of failing 
to allocate the distressed firm’s assets to their highest-valued use. They would also 
include the costs resulting from unnecessary delay in the completion of the 
proceedings, as this will impact negatively on the value of the firm’s goodwill. One 
possible proxy for ex post indirect costs therefore consists of the duration of the 
insolvency proceedings (Bris et al, 2006).  
Indirect costs are also thought to have ex ante components, which, because 
they affect all firms, as opposed to simply those which enter bankruptcy proceedings, 
are potentially much greater than the ex post components (White, 1996). These 
include the incentive effects of bankruptcy on management’s investment strategy 
                                               
9
 Only the holder of a floating charge could appoint an administratrive receiver (UK Insolvency Act 
1986 s 29(2)). The floating charge has a lower priority ranking than other forms of secured debt in UK 
corporate insolvencies (see Ferran, 2008). Thus in situations where the face value of total secured debt 
is more than the value of the firm’s assets, the floating charge holder will be undersecured.  
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(Schwartz, 1994) and on the credibility of the creditor’s threat to enforce (Hart, 1995). 
Whilst it is possible to think of ways to measure ex post indirect costs, it is very 
difficult to think how this might be done for ex ante costs. 
 
Direct costs 
Direct bankruptcy costs have been studied empirically in various jurisdictions. These 
are typically reported as a ratio of total firm value, in order to control for firm size. 
Possible denominators for comparison include the value of the prebankruptcy assets 
(either at book, or estimated market value, if available) and the market value of 
postbankruptcy assets, as realised by sales (which can be presented either as a gross 
figure or net of the associated costs of sale). The results of prior studies using samples 
of private firms, between them encompassing a variety of bankruptcy regimes, are 
summarised in Table 2.10 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Results reported in Franks and Sussman (2000) and Citron et al (2004) suggest 
that the mean costs of insolvency practitioner remuneration in a typical UK 
receivership were in the region of 25% of the value of the postbankruptcy assets, net 
of the costs of realisation. Franks and Sussman (2000) also report mean costs for a 
sample of 7 pre-Enterprise Act administrations, which were slightly higher, at 26.3%. 
However, the sample size is so small that little significance can be attached to this 
finding. 
Other studies report costs as a fraction of gross postbankruptcy asset values. 
This tends to reduce the percentage reported. Thus Citron et al (2004) report a mean 
(median) cost of 15.2% (14.6%) of gross postbankruptcy assets for a sample of 65 
                                               
10
 Lubben (2008) reports findings from a large random sample of 945 chapter 11 reorganizations, 
mainly private firms. The mean level of professional fees (excluding one outlier case) is 4.0% of 
prebankruptcy assets (measured by market value) plus debts at the start of the proceedings. The results 
are not given simply as a proportion of prebankruptcy assets, and hence the findings are not directly 
comparable with other prior studies.  
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MBO firms that subsequently went into receivership. This is similar to the figures 
reported by Thorburn (2000) for the Swedish bankruptcy process, in which firms are 
mandatorily auctioned within a year (mean 19.1%, median 13.2%).11  
A number of studies report that the duration of insolvency proceedings 
(Thorburn, 2000; Franks and Sussman, 2005; Bris et al, 2006; Lubben, 2008) and the 
size of the debtor firm (Lawless and Ferris, 2000; LoPucki and Doherty, 2004; Bris et 
al, 2006; Lubben, 2008) are significant determinants of direct costs. The longer the 
proceedings take to complete, the greater the professional fees likely to be involved, 
and the greater the value of the assets at stake, the more effort is likely to be required 
to assess and market them.  
 
Hypotheses regarding direct costs 
Administration involves a greater likelihood of court appearances. Moreover, the 
administrator will be required to engage in several types of ‘accountability’ related 
actions that would not be necessitated under receivership: preparing and circulating 
reports to creditors; calling and conducting creditors’ meetings; preparing reasons for 
their actions, etc. All of these may be expected to lead to increased costs as compared 
with receivership (Frisby, 2004; Armour and Mokal, 2005).  
 At the same time, if it was the case that lack of control by (over)secured 
creditors tended to lead to needlessly inflated costs in receivership, then it might be 
expected that administration, with enhanced mechanisms of accountability to 
unsecured creditors, would reduce these costs (Mokal, 2004). A contrary view might 
be that unsecured creditors are typically likely to be dispersed and so suffer from free-
rider problems in exercising control over insolvency practitioners. This might lead 
                                               
11
 These costs seem somewhat higher than those reported by Lawless and Ferris (2000) and Bris et al 
(2006) for Chapter 11 proceedings in the US. However, it is likely that this is because the salary of 
managers of firms in Chapter 11 is reported as an operating expense as opposed to a ‘bankruptcy’ cost, 
meaning that procedures in which the firm is managed by an outside appointee may be expected to 
generate higher reported direct costs. This conjecture is supported by results from Lawless and Ferris 
(1997) and Bris et al (2006) suggesting that US Chapter 7 proceedings have significantly higher direct 
costs than Chapter 11. 
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them to have difficulty in operationalizing their new mechanisms of accountability 
(creditors’ meetings and lawsuits against insolvency practitioners). In contrast to the 
problems with concentrated creditor control, which occur only when the lender is 
oversecured, the problems of dispersed creditor governance would manifest 
themselves in all cases. When combined with increased process costs, therefore, the 
outcome—ironically—might be expected to be increased costs as a result of the shift 
to the new regime.   
Interviewees to whom we spoke confirmed these intuitions. They reported that 
there were real process costs involved in conducting a creditors’ meeting and 
preparing a ‘paper trail’ to guard against legal liability. Moreover, interviewees from 
banks suggested that they typically negotiated a ‘bulk’ rate with insolvency 
practitioners regarding fee arrangements. In contrast, when fees are put to creditors’ 
meetings for approval, the unsecured creditors are offered a higher rate, which is 
accepted because the unsecured creditors are disinterested in the process. The 
foregoing points lead us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Direct costs are likely to be larger in administration than in 
administrative receivership. 
 
2.3.3 Other Outcomes 
The difference between administration and administrative receivership may also be 
expected to have several other effects on outcomes. 
 
Duration of proceedings (indirect costs) 
Administration proceedings are limited to one year, although this may be extended 
with the permission of the court or of a majority of the creditors.12 Receivership 
proceedings, although commonly thought to be ‘quick’, are not subject to any legal 
time limit. Citron et al (2004) found that, in a sample of 65 receiverships, only 3.1% 
were completed within one year and 37% took more than 3 years. We might therefore 
                                               
12
 UK Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1, para 76. 
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predict that administration proceedings are likely to take less time than receiverships. 
To the extent that duration of proceedings is a proxy for indirect costs, this also 
implies reduced indirect costs (Bris et al, 2006). 
 
Asset deployment  
An oversecured senior lender may be expected to have a bias in favour of liquidation 
fire sales, as against continuation of the business, on the basis that the former may be 
quicker and less risky. Consistently with this, Ayotte and Morrison (2008) report that 
in a sample of Chapter 11 proceedings in the US, asset fire sales are more likely in 
cases where the secured lenders are oversecured. Consequently, if the perverse 
incentive problem has been resolved by the new mechanisms of governance in 
administration, then we would expect to see more going concern sales, and more 
trading activity, in administration. 
 
Creditor recoveries 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that gross recoveries are likely to be larger in administration 
than in administrative receivership. Hypothesis 2 predicts that costs will, however, 
also increase too. It is difficult to predict a priori how these two predicted changes 
might interact to affect net recoveries for creditors, which are the value of recoveries 
minus costs.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
We study data on asset realisations and costs incurred in UK bankruptcy proceedings 
before and after the changes introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, which came into 
force on 15 September 2003. We use a hand-constructed dataset of 340 cases of 
formal insolvency to compare receiverships under the old law with administrations 
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under the new law. This is larger than most datasets of bankruptcy costs that have 
been studied in the US.13   
A random sample of 500 cases, comprising 250 receiverships commencing 
between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 250 administrations 
commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004,14 were first 
identified using the index of insolvency appointments published in the London 
Gazette. Data relating to each case were then entered manually from reports filed at 
the UK public register of companies, Companies House, by insolvency practitioners.15 
From the Statement of Affairs form, which must be filed shortly after the 
practitioner’s appointment, we extracted the book value of assets, the directors’ 
estimate of the market value of the company’s assets, and the amount of creditors’ 
claims, all as of the beginning of proceedings. Insolvency practitioners are also 
required to file progress reports as the proceedings continue and final statements of 
receipts and payments on completion of a case. From these, we collect information on 
the duration of the bankruptcy procedure, the realisation value of the firm’s assets 
(that is, their postbankruptcy market value), the total remuneration paid to the 
insolvency practitioner and other bankruptcy-related direct costs, and distributions 
made to creditors. We exclude cases for which the bankruptcy procedure was not 
completed by 1 February 2006, and cases for which the relevant abstracts of receipts 
and payments were not available in electronic form via the Companies House Direct 
service.16 This yielded a sample of 109 pre-Enterprise Act receiverships and 195 
administrations, as shown in Table 3.  
                                               
13
 See above, text to nn 10-11. The exception is Lubben (2008), who studies over 1000 cases (random 
sample of 945 plus non-random sample of 81 cases). 
14
 The corporate bankruptcy provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force on 15 September 
2003.  
15
 For details of the forms that must be completed by Insolvency Practitioners running a case, see 
Companies House (2005), chs 3&4.  
16
 See www.direct.companieshouse.gov.uk  
 16 
To explore the pattern of realisations and insolvency costs across different 
firm characteristics, further information about the firm’s SIC industry code and 
accounting data was obtained from the FAME database.17 Panel C reports the 
distribution of the sample firms by industry at the 1-digit SIC code level. It appears 
that approximately 45% of the sample in the two respective proceedings is comprised 
of firms in the construction industry and in wholesale or retail trading. However, the 
overall industry composition of the two proceeding subsamples is similar. 
For the purposes of robustness checks (detailed in section 4.4), we also 
gathered an additional random sample of post-Enterprise Act receiverships—that is, 
receiverships commencing after 15 September 2003 and before 31 December 2004, 
using powers ‘grandfathered’ under floating charges created before the Enterprise Act 
came into force.18 After excluding cases where data were not available for variables of 
interests, this yielded a modest sample of 36 post-Enterprise Act receiverships. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on various characteristics of sample 
firms. Panel A reports pre-bankruptcy characteristics of our sample firms. This clearly 
paints a picture of a dataset comprising primarily small firms, with the most recent 
annual accounts showing a turnover of less than £4m and book value of assets of less 
than £3.5m. These are also relatively young firms, with a mean age of less than 20 
years, and a median nearer 10. As may be expected, there is a stark decline between 
book values shown in the last annual accounts and estimated market values on entry 
into insolvency proceedings. Whilst the firms in our sample are heavily overindebted 
                                               
17
 The FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database provides detailed company accounting and 
financial information on UK and Irish public and private firms. 
18
 See supra, section 2.2. 
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on entry, the mean firm undergoing either insolvency procedure is oversecured, in the 
sense that the estimated market value of its assets is significantly more than the face 
value of the debt owed to secured creditors. There is one statistically significant 
difference in means, which concerns the proportion of total debt that is secured. This 
is higher for pre-Enterprise Act receivership (mean 0.424, median 0.402) than for 
administration (mean 0.261, median 0.228), and higher still in the post-Act 
receivership sample (mean 0.569, median 0.618).  
Panel B reports summary statistics on characteristics of our sample cases of 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
3.1 Duration 
The average duration of proceedings for pre-Act receivership (mean 627 days, median 
602 days) was nearly twice as long as for administration (mean 357 days, median 358 
days) and even for post-Act receivership (mean 393 days, median 413 days). This is 
consistent with expectations: administration proceedings are subject to a statutory 
time limit of one year (extendable with the consent of the court or of creditors), 
whereas receivership has no fixed time limit.19  
 
3.2 Realisations  
Insolvency practitioners in receivership and administration cases are required to 
submit to the Registrar of Companies, at six-monthly intervals, a ‘Receiver’s Abstract 
of Receipts and Payments’ or an ‘Administrator’s Progress Report’, respectively. 
When assets are sold during the reporting period, the gross realisations must be 
entered as receipts and related costs entered as payments. We classify the receipt 
items as the asset realisations and the associated costs as direct insolvency costs on 
the grounds that costs of these types (namely, legal fees, investigation fees, 
advertisement fees, and appraisal fees) are normally unavoidable and are related to the 
efforts beings made by the insolvency practitioners to realise value for the creditors. 
                                               
19
 See supra, section 2.2. 
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However, in cases where the insolvency practitioner continued to operate the 
business as a going concern, it would be inappropriate to treat operating costs as part 
of the costs of the insolvency procedure. To help distinguish sums received and paid 
in the course of trading from asset realisations and associated costs, administrators 
typically provide a separate trading receipts and payments account in cases where the 
business continued to operate.20 Hence, to ensure robustness, two measures of 
realisations were employed in our study: 
R1: total asset realisations 
R2: total asset realisations + net trading receipts  
Simply comparing realisations, of course, would not give a meaningful 
comparison between procedures unless those figures can be standardised by a measure 
of firm size. Consistently with prior literature (LoPucki and Doherty, 2004; Bris et al., 
2006), we use the estimated value of the firm’s assets at entry into bankruptcy as an 
indicator of size. The value is extracted from the Statement of Affairs prepared by 
directors shortly after an insolvency practitioner is appointed. The directors are 
required to provide an abbreviated balance sheet containing their best estimate of the 
current value of the firm’s assets and liabilities as at the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings. We winsorize these data at the 1% and 99% level. Panel B of 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for these two measures.  
The ratio of the value of actual realisations in bankruptcy to the estimated 
prebankruptcy value of the firm’s assets yields one measure of the ‘effectiveness’ of 
the insolvency practitioner in realising assets. To be sure, the directors’ estimates are 
not audited, and may well be subject to an optimism bias. Provided that this does not 
differ systematically as between administration and administrative receivership—and 
we have no reason for thinking that it should—then this ratio can nevertheless provide 
a meaningful way of comparing the effectiveness of the two procedures. Two sets of 
summary statistics for this measure of effectiveness, based respectively on total 
                                               
20
 In most of the receivership cases, the receiver did not provide a separate trading receipt and payment 
accounts. In these cases, information on gross trading receipts and net trading receipts was identified 
from the receiver’s general ‘abstract of receipts and payments’ report.  
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realizations (R1) and total realizations plus net trading receipts (R2), are also reported 
in Panel B of Table 4.  For both measures, the median for our pre-Enterprise Act 
receivership sample is significantly smaller than for our administration sample. There 
is no statistically significant difference in the means.  
 
3.3 Costs 
We employ two measures of the direct costs of insolvency proceedings: (i) the 
remuneration paid to insolvency practitioners, and (ii) total direct costs (comprising, 
in addition to insolvency practitioner remuneration, all the costs associated with the 
realisation of the assets, e.g. legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc). In order 
to interpret the results meaningfully across the two different proceedings, we scale the 
costs by the estimated market value, from the Statement of Affairs, of the firm’s total 
assets on entry into bankruptcy. We winsorize these data at the 1% and 99% level. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports summary statistics for both remuneration and total direct 
costs. For both measures, both the mean and the median for our pre-Enterprise Act 
receivership sample are significantly smaller than for our administration sample.  
 
3.4. Other Outcomes  
Panel B of Table 4 also presents summary statistics on three further measures of 
outcomes. The recovery rate is calculated as the distribution paid to a class of 
creditors over the face of their claims. The recovery rate is thus subclassified into total 
recovery rate, secured creditor recovery rate, preferential creditor recovery rate and 
unsecured recovery rate. There are no significant differences between mean recovery 
rates for the pre-Act receivership and administration samples, although recoveries in 
the post-Act receivership sample are significantly higher than for administration. 
Finally, we also present descriptive statistics for two binary indicators of 
outcomes: the proportion of cases in which the firm continues to trade during the 
bankruptcy proceedings, and the proportion of cases in which a going concern sale of 
some or all of the firm’s business—as opposed to a piecemeal sale—is achieved. In 
each case, the receivership and administration samples are very similar. 
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 Table 5 explores univariate correlations between our variables of interest. Type 
is a dummy variable taking the value of one for administration proceedings and zero 
for receivership. It is modestly positively correlated with measures of realisations and 
of costs, providing initial support for hypotheses 1 and 2. There is little correlation 
between our main variables. Few of the independent variables are correlated, implying 
that  multicollinearity is not a concern.  
 
4 Multivariate Empirical Tests 
This section presents empirical tests as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively 
report results regarding realisations and costs. We then (Section 4.3) report various 
robustness checks, and discuss limitations and possible future research (Section 4.4). 
 
4.1 Realisations  
 In Table 6, we report findings on the determinants of realisations in our sample cases, 
comparing receiverships before the Enterprise Act 2002 with administrations after the 
change in the law. To ensure robustness of the results, we report specifications using 
two different measures of the dependent variable. In Panel A, we use total asset 
realisations (that is, the gross proceeds of sale of the firm’s assets), and in Panel B we 
use total asset realisations plus net trading receipts during the bankruptcy procedure. 
In each case we scale the dependent variable by firm size (measured by the estimated 
market value on entry to bankruptcy) and subject it to a logarithmic transformation.  
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
 
 Table 6 Panels A and B each report specifications designed to test hypotheses 
1 and 1A. Type is a dummy variable taking the value of one for administration cases 
and zero for pre-Act receiverships. Model 1 is our basic specification, in which we 
include as controls a range of variables which may be expected influence realisations, 
including whether the office-holder continues to trade the business or closes it down 
(Trade), whether a going concern sale or a break up sale occurs (Outcome), the 
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number of days taken to complete the proceedings (Duration), the firm’s leverage, 
measured against the market value of its prebankruptcy assets (Debt_ratio), and firm 
size, also measured in terms of the market value of prebankruptcy assets (Size). We 
also include industry and year fixed effects.  
The results for Model 1 are supportive of hypothesis 1. For both measures of 
the dependent variable, the coefficient for Type is positive and statistically significant 
(at the 5% level for realisations including net trading receipts—Panel B—and at the 
10% level for realisations excluding trading receipts—Panel A). This indicates that 
realisations are higher in administration cases than in receiverships. As the dependent 
variables are expressed as natural logarithms, the coefficients measure the elasticity of 
the (scaled) realisation amount with respect to explanatory variables. That is, when 
the explanatory variable is also a natural logarithm, the coefficient indicates the 
percentage change in the amount of realisations amount that is associated either with a 
1% change in the explanatory variable or with the value of a dummy variable, holding 
all other variables constant. Thus the coefficients for Type in Model 1 indicate that 
mean asset realisations and asset realisations net of trading receipts are, respectively , 
3.3% and 4.1% higher in administration than receivership, when scaled for firm size.  
Models 2 and 3 provide tests of hypothesis 1A specifically, namely that the increase 
in realisations in administrations is likely to be particularly associated with cases 
where secured lenders are oversecured. Model 2 is identical to Model 1, but with the 
addition of an additional dummy variable, Oversecured, which takes the value of one 
if the market value of the debtor’s assets on entry to bankruptcy is greater than the 
face value of secured debt, and zero otherwise. The coefficient for Oversecured is not 
statistically significant, and the coefficient for Type remains positive and statistically 
significant (increasing from the 10% to the 5% level in Panel A).  
 Model 3 is identical to Model 2, but with the addition of an interaction term, 
Oversecured*Type which captures the joint effect of both being in administration 
rather than receivership and having oversecured lenders. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level and the 
coefficient for Type is no longer statistically significant. This implies that the increase 
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in realisations in administration captured by the positive coefficient for Type in 
Models 1 and 2 is actually driven by cases where the secured lenders are oversecured. 
The coefficient for Oversecured is negative and statistically significant in Model 3. 
This indicates that, over the sample as a whole, oversecured secured lenders are 
associated with lower realisations. However, the size of the negative coefficient is 
smaller than the positive coefficient on the interaction term Oversecured*Type, 
implying that for firms in administration, the negative effect of being oversecured is 
more than cancelled out by the difference in procedure.  These results are strongly 
supportive of hypothesis 1A. As regards economic significance, these coefficients 
imply that where secured lenders are oversecured, use of administration rather than 
receivership is associated with a 4% increase in total realisations, and a 4.8% increase 
in realisations net of trading receipts, both scaled for firm size. These results are 
robust to the exclusion of each of the independent variables, although we do not report 
these specifications.21  
 A number of the coefficients for control variables are also statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient for Trade in all specifications implies that, as 
expected, cases where the office-holder continues to trade the business are associated 
with higher realisations. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
Debt_ratio indicates that higher leverage is associated with greater realisations, 
although the relatively small size of these coefficients indicates that its economic 
significance is small. The coefficients for Size are negative and highly statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) in all specifications, indicating that there is a scale effect 
in realisations, with smaller debtors yielding disproportionately larger realisations. 
The coefficients for Duration, which are positive, are statistically significant in Panel 
A (total asset realisations) but not Panel B (asset realisations plus net trading receipts). 
This is probably because the dependent variable in Panel B takes into account the 
trading payments associated with continued trading, which will be rising in the time 
spent in insolvency proceedings.  
                                               
21
 Further specifications are available on request.  
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4.2 Direct Costs 
Table 7 reports results on the determinants of direct costs, once again comparing 
receiverships before the Enterprise Act 2002 with administrations after the change in 
the law. We once more report specifications based on two different measures of costs, 
being natural logs, scaled by firm size, of (i) the fees paid to the insolvency 
practitioner running the case (Remuneration), and (ii) remuneration plus any other 
direct costs incurred in the proceedings—for example, surveyors’ fees, legal fees, 
marketing costs etc (Total direct cost). 
  
    [Table 7 about here] 
 
We used the same explanatory variables as in our analysis of realisations, namely a 
dummy for use of administration as opposed to receivership (Type), dummies for 
continued trading (Trade) and going concern sale (Outcome), log of time spent in 
proceedings (Duration), ratio of debt to market value of assets at the commencement 
of bankruptcy (Debt ratio),  firm size as measured by market value of assets (Size), 
and dummies for oversecured secured lenders (Oversecured) and an interaction term 
for use of administration when secured lenders are oversecured (Oversecured*Type). 
We also include dummies to control for industry and year fixed effects. Consistently 
with hypothesis 2a, and with the descriptive statistics, all specifications show that the 
bankruptcy procedure used makes an economically, and strongly statistically 
significant difference to the ratio of costs to total value of the realisations. We also ran 
a number of other specifications (not reported), to which the results were robust.  
Our results indicate that direct costs in administration are higher than in pre-
Act receivership cases by a factor of between 4.7% and 5.9%. Cases in which the 
insolvency practitioner decides to carry on the trading can result in higher 
remuneration costs and total direct costs, and all of the costs are positively correlated 
with the length of proceedings. The negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for Size imply that, consistently with prior research (LoPucki and Doherty, 2006) 
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there is a scale effect in costs in our sample. This presumably results from a fixed cost 
element associated with any appointment, leading to a declining costs rate (as a 
proportion of assets) for firms with larger assets. We find little evidence of any 
industry effect, or that the choice between going concern sale and piecemeal sale has 
costs implications. We find no evidence that having oversecured lenders makes any 
difference to direct costs.  
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
Our empirical strategy has been to compare two samples of firms in bankruptcy taken 
from before and after a change in the law. A possible confounding factor is introduced 
by the fact that holders of floating charges created before the date of commencement 
of the Enterprise Act (15th September 2003) retain the right to appoint receivers after 
the new law came into force.22 Thus in a subset of cases after the change in the law, 
lenders are able to choose whether to use administration or receivership, which may 
introduce an element of selection bias into the administration sample. If secured 
lenders seek to maximise their expected net returns, then they will choose the 
procedure most likely to maximise recoveries and minimise costs. This selection 
effect would, if present, tend to bias results for administration towards higher 
recoveries and lower costs than pre-act receivership. In other words, it would be a bias 
in favour of hypothesis 1 but against hypothesis 2. Moreover, as the decision is 
controlled by the secured lender, we would expect such a selection bias to be most 
pronounced in cases where the lender is undersecured. The intuition is that where a 
secured lender is oversecured, they will be less concerned about the selection of a 
value-maximising procedure. If such a selection effect is present in the post-Act 
samples, it may be expected to manifest itself in the following ways: (i) post-Act 
receiverships may be expected to have higher realisations and/or lower costs than pre-
Act receiverships, and (ii) there may be expected to be no, or less, difference in 
realisations and costs between post-Act receiverships and administrations.  
                                               
22
 See supra, section 2.2. 
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 In order to investigate this issue, we collected data on an additional 50 
receivership cases, commenced after the introduction of the Enterprise Act. After 
discarding cases for which data on all variables of interest were not available, this 
yielded a sample of 36 post-Enterprise Act receivership cases. We then ran similar 
tests to those reported in sections 5.1 and 5.2 investigating the determinants of 
realisations and costs but instead comparing first pre- with post-Act receiverships and 
then post-Act administrations with post-Act receiverships.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 Table 8 reports findings on the determinants of realisations and costs in 
receiverships both before and after the Enterprise Act 2002. The same independent 
variables are included as in Tables 6 and 7, save that in place of the dummy for type 
of bankruptcy procedure, we now include a dummy for procedures commencing post- 
the introduction of the new law (Post). Whilst the coefficients for most of the same 
explanatory variables are statistically significant as in tables 6 and 7, Post is not 
statistically significant in any specification. We thus find no evidence that realisation 
values are greater, or costs smaller, in post-Act receiverships. This is contrary to what 
we would expect were lenders using their influence to select receivership after the Act 
in cases where this would maximise their recoveries. Moreover, the coefficient for the 
dummy Oversecured is negative in respect of total realisations and realisations plus 
net trading receipts, but the coefficient of the interaction term on oversecured and 
post-Act is not significant. This implies that receivers generate fewer realisations 
when they are appointed by an oversecured lender, and that this effect is not 
measurably different between the pre-Act and post-Act samples.  
 Table 9 reports the results of regressions investigating the determinants of 
realisations and costs in receiverships and administrations commenced after the 
Enterprise Act 2002. Because the choice of procedure may be endogenous to the 
expected realisations and costs, and to the level of secured debt, we use a two-stage 
treatment effects regression. The first (treatment) stage is a probit regression where 
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the dependent variable is the choice of bankruptcy procedure, a dummy taking the 
value one for administration and zero for receivership (Panel A). We include firm 
size, age, debt ratio and the proportion of secured debt as explanatory variables. Of 
these, only the coefficients for firm age and proportion of secured debt are statistically 
significant, indicating that older firms are more likely to go into administration, and 
firms with higher proportions of secured debt are more likely to go into receivership.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
 The second stage regression (Panel B) includes the full range of explanatory 
variables discussed above. The coefficients for type of bankruptcy procedure (Type) 
are significant where the dependent variable is costs, but not where it is realisations. 
Thus, controlling for potential selection effects in the post-Enterprise Act sample, we 
do not find any evidence that administration is associated with higher recoveries than 
receivership. We do, however, find robust evidence that it is associated with higher 
costs. 
 The results of these tests incorporating the post-Act receivership sample show 
that our finding of increased costs associated with administration as compared to 
receivership, which supports hypothesis 2, is highly robust. This is true both for a 
comparison between pre-Act receivership and post-Act administration (Table 7) as 
well as between post-Act administrations and receiverships (Table 9) in a treatment 
effects specification. Moreover, the costs of receiverships have not increased 
significantly since the Enterprise Act (Table 8) further evidencing that the increase is 
associated with use of administration, rather than with any other developments that 
may have influenced insolvency procedures more generally. 
 The findings as regards realisations are less clear-cut. Our comparison of pre-
Act receivership with post-Act administration (Table 6) suggested that administration 
was associated with higher realisations, especially where the secured lender is 
oversecured, supporting hypotheses 1 and 1A. However, one interpretation of the 
absence of a significant difference in realisations between post Act receiverships and 
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administrations in Table 9 is that secured lenders are selecting the procedure so as to 
maximise realisations. This consequently raises a suggestion of selection bias in the 
post-Act administration sample, which would bias the sample in favour of hypothesis 
1 and 1A in the tests conducted in Table 6. Yet if this were the case, we would expect 
the bias—and consequent uplift in recoveries for post-Act administration as against 
pre-Act receivership—to be strongest in cases where the secured creditor is 
undersecured, as here they will have the strongest incentive to select a procedure 
which will maximise their recoveries. However Table 6 reports that the increase in 
realisations is driven entirely by cases in which the lender is oversecured. In such 
cases the lender should be indifferent in selection as between administration and 
receivership. The size of our post-Act receivership sample is small, and it may simply 
be that any realisations effect is so small that we do not have statistical power to 
capture it in our treatment effects specification.  
 Moreover, we find no evidence that realisations have increased in post-Act 
receiverships as compared to receiverships commenced prior to the Enterprise Act 
(Table 8). We would expect to see such an increase if, after the Act, lender selection 
was biasing procedure choice towards those expected to yield higher realisations. This 
tends to contradict the inference of selection bias, and indirectly supports hypothesis 
1. Moreover, Table 8 provides further support for hypothesis 1A in reporting a 
negative association between oversecured lenders and realisations in receiverships 
both before and after the change in the law. This implies that oversecured lenders 
were associated with lower returns in receiverships before the change in the law, and 
that this effect is still present in post-Act receiverships.  
   
4.4 Limitations and Future Research 
There is necessarily a considerable amount of uncertainty involved in the application 
of a new bankruptcy procedure. Empirical results from the early years of the Chapter 
11 procedure in the US found that the (then) new law had given debtors a great deal of 
power, and creditors correspondingly less (LoPucki 1983). However, the law’s effect 
has tended to become diluted with time as participants respond by ‘contracting 
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around’ the law (Baird and Rasmussen, 2002; Skeel, 2004). A similar process may 
well occur in the UK. It is therefore too soon to say whether the changes documented 
in our results will persist, or whether they may simply be disequilibrium effects 
resulting from transition. Further research conducted after the Enterprise Act regime 
has had time to ‘bed down’ would shed light on this issue.  
However, a study of the immediate impact of a change in the law is 
nevertheless valuable because it offers a more direct comparison of the old and new 
regimes than a study with an intervening gap of several years. The wider the time 
difference between the two samples, the greater the possibility a temporal bias may be 
introduced, if unobserved time-variant effects impact upon the costs and recoveries in 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
Recent changes in UK bankruptcy law have made it possible to examine empirically 
the costs and benefits of different degrees of secured creditor control in bankruptcy. 
The move in 2003 from receivership to administration may be seen in stylised terms 
as effecting a shift in control rights from secured to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings. To investigate the impact of this change, we present findings from a 
hand-coded dataset of 340 bankruptcy cases, which comprises the largest sample of 
bankruptcy realisations and costs yet reported.23  
We find that cases conducted under the new administration procedure are 
much quicker than receiverships, taking on average a little over half the time. This is 
entirely consistent with predictions, given the statutory time limit for administration 
proceedings.  
Our strongest finding is that the direct costs associated with bankruptcy are 
greater in administration than in receivership, controlling for a range of other 
explanatory variables. This result is robust to the possibility of bias in the selection of 
                                               
23
 Lubben (2008) reports findings on bankruptcy costs for a much larger sample, but does not 
investigate realisations.  
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bankruptcy procedure in the post-Enterprise Act environment introduced by the 
retention of a power to appoint a receiver by lenders with floating charges granted 
before 15 September 2003, to control for which we used a treatment effects 
specification to compare the costs associated with post-Act receiverships and 
administrations. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 2, which asserts that 
the greater use of legal mechanisms of accountability in administration—through the 
administrators’ fiduciary duties to all creditors, and the need to take a creditor vote in 
many cases—will introduce concomitant costs not present in receivership.  
At the same time, we find evidence consistent with hypothesis 1, namely that 
administration cases are associated with higher gross recoveries than were 
receiverships. Moreover this difference is entirely driven by cases where the secured 
lender is oversecured. This is consistent with the intuition that greater accountability 
to unsecured creditors encourages administrators to act more effectively to generate 
recoveries in cases where, as fiduciaries for the senior claimant, they would have 
lacked sufficient incentives under receivership. However, this finding is less robust 
than our findings regarding costs, and we cannot exclude the possibility that it is an 
artefact of secured lenders’ ability to select between administration and receivership 
where they have a floating charge pre-dating the change in the law.  
Thus whilst gross realisations in administration are higher, so too are costs, 
and it appears that the net effect on creditors therefore is equivocal. Moreover, 
administrations do not result in any significantly greater incidence of continued 
trading or going-concern sales than did receiverships, indicating that the new 
procedure is not preserving any more employment. 
Our findings may be summarised as follows: the shift from secured to 
unsecured creditor control has increased the power of the insolvency practitioner—the 
agent—as against the creditors—the principals. The very high costs awards under 
administration imply that in many cases, the professional running the case is 
effectively the residual claimant. In turn, this provides an alternative, and less benign, 
explanation for the increase in gross recoveries under the new regime: it is because, 
with weak monitoring from unsecured creditors, insolvency practitioners have 
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themselves become the residual claimant in UK bankruptcies: they have a strong 
incentive to maximise the recoveries that will go to pay fee income.  
Insofar as it is appropriate to give a welfare interpretation of our results, it 
appears to be negative. There is no appreciable difference in decisions concerning the 
allocation of the firm’s assets (that is, continuation or closure) following the change in 
the law. The increase in gross realisations appears to be a distributional matter, with 
administrators appointed in the presence of oversecured lenders working harder to 
extract more of the surplus from asset buyers than do their colleagues appointed as 
receivers. However, the increase in direct costs implies a greater deadweight loss. As 
a result, administration appears to achieve lower ex post efficiency than receivership.  
Our results also have more general implications for the debate about 
bankruptcy contracting and the desirability of secured creditor control. The change in 
UK bankruptcy governance, in essence, involves a crossing of the central fault line of 
corporate governance: a shift in control from a concentrated investor to many 
dispersed investors. With concentrated investor control, the main governance problem 
is how to prevent them from extracting rents from other investors. With control rights 
in the hands of dispersed investors, the problem is rather how to prevent those 
managing the firm from extracting rents. No clear consensus has emerged as to which 
of these is preferable. Our results imply that concentrated creditor governance in 
bankruptcy, in the form of strong control rights allocated to a single concentrated 
lender, does on average at least as good a job at preserving jobs and generating 
recoveries for creditors as does a relatively sophisticated legal procedure designed to 
allocate control to the residual claimant.  
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Date Profession Location Expertise Digital 
Record 
1. 06-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Birmingham  N 
2. 12-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Nottingham  N 
3. 20-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (‘big 
four’ firm) 
Birmingham  N 
4. 21-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (‘big 
four’ firm) 
Birmingham  N 
5. 24-08-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Birmingham  N 
6. 08-11-05 Regulator (IPA)  London  N 
7. 08-11-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
London  N 
8. 22-12-05 Regulator (IPA) London  N 
9. 22-12-05 Insolvency 
practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
London  N 
10. 18-04-06 Accountant/pensions 
expert (‘big four’ 
firm) 
London  Y 
11. 03-05-06 Credit insurer London  Y 
12. 19-06-06 Banker (clearing 
bank) 
London  Y 
13. 30-06-06 Banker (clearing 
bank) 
Bristol  N 
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Table 2: Prior literature on the direct costs of bankruptcy in private firms 
 
Authors (year) Jurisdiction, procedure, 
firm type 
N Mean costs, % of 
starting values (median) 
Mean costs, % of final 











US: private firms, Ch 7 98 - 6.1 (1.1) - 13.5 (2.1) 
Lawless and 
Ferris (2000) 
US: private firms, Ch 11 
 
118 - 17.6 (3.5) - 7.6 (4.7) 
 
Bris et al (2006) US: private firms, Ch 7 
 





















       
Thorburn 
(2000) 
Sweden, public and 
private firms, auction  
263 6.4 (4.5) - 19.1 (13.2) - 
       
Franks and 
Sussman (2000) 
UK, private firms, r’ship 











Citron et al 
(2004) 
UK, MBO firms, 
receivership 






Table 3 Sample  
The table reports sample collection (Panel A),the year in which our sample cases entered each insolvency 
proceedings (Panel B) and industry distributions (Panel C).  Industry classifications are based on 1-digit SIC code. 
 
Panel A. Data collection Firm-year observations 
 Pre-act  
Receivership 
Administration  Post-act 
receivership  
As the corporate bankruptcy provisions of the Enterprise 
Act 2002 came into force on 15 September 2003, a random 
sample of random samples of 250 receiverships (Pre-act) 
commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 
2003 and 250 administrations commencing between 15 
September 2003 and 31 December 2004, respectively, were 
first identified using the index of insolvency appointments 
published in the London Gazette. For robustness tests, we 
also randomly select 50 post-act receiverships commencing 
between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004 from 
London Gazette. 
250 250 50 
    
Less: We exclude cases in which the insolvency procedure 
had not been completed by February 2006 and cases for 
which Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts, and Payments or 
Administrator’s Progress Report are unavailable in 
electronic form on the Companies House website 
(www.direct.companieshouse.gov.uk). We also exclude 
firm-year observations for which the industry information 
and firm-year characteristics from FAME are missing. 
(141) (55) (14) 
 109 195 36 
Panel B. Sample distribution by year and procedure types 
 
Firm-year observations 




2001 16 16   
2002 54 54   
2003 88 39 42 7 
2004 182  153 29 
 340 109 195 36 
Panel C. Sample distribution by industry 
 
Firm-year observations 




Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1) 1 0 1 0 
Mining (2) 19 8 10 1 
Construction (3) 79 28 42 9 
Manufacturing (4) 38 12 23 3 
Transportation, communication, electric, 
gas and sanitary services (5) 31 6 24 1 
Wholesale / retail trade (6) 82 28 48 6 
Service (7) 90 27 47 16 





Table 4 Summary statistics  
This table reports pre-bankruptcy firm characteristics (Panel A) and firm characteristics during bankruptcy 
proceedings (Panel B). Data for pre-act receiverships commences between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 
2003, and data for post-act receivership/administrations commences between 15 September 2003 and 31 
December 2004. Oversecured portion is the face value of secured creditors’ claims divided by the estimated value 
of total assets at the entry to insolvency. Both remuneration fees and direct costs are obtained from ‘receiver’s 
abstract of receipts and payments’ (under receivership) and ‘administrator’s progress report’ (under 
administration). Direct costs comprises remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. 
Recovery is the net difference between asset realizations plus net trading sales, and total direct costs divided by 
total claims. Proportion of trade is the number of cases that choose to continue trading during insolveny 
proceedings among whole cases in that legal proceeding. Proportion of outcome is the number of cases that is a 
going concern sale relative to whole cases in that legal proceeding. 
 
Panel A: Pre-bankruptcy firm characteristics  
Variables Mean STD 25% 50% 75% 









Age        
Pre-Act receivership 16.698 15.426 6.219 9.958 22.150 -0.28(-0.38) 1.50(2.07**) 
Post-act Receivership 12.564 12.941 3.694 8.169 16.194 -1.95*(-2.43**)  
Administration 17.242 16.808 6.292 11.603 21.664   
Turnover        
Pre-Act receivership 3,841.757 6,898.348 0.000 1,738.000 4,489 0.60(2.58**) 1.27(1.45) 
Post-act Receivership 2,249.861 5,345.048 0.000 173.500 3,184 -0.87(0.15)  
Administration 3,224.682 9,433.749 0.000 0.000 1,932  
Book value of assets (BV) 
Pre-Act receivership 1,530,000 1,880,000 351,000 907,000 1,690,000 -0.68(3.28***) 1.61(1.65*) 
Post-act Receivership 1,070,000 1,250,000 208,000 552,000 1,640,000 -1.16(0.33)  
Administration 3,320,000 26,900,000 179,000 461,000 1,320,000   
Estimated market value of assets at entry to bankruptcy 
Pre-Act receivership 805,000 1,220,000 200,000 439,000 911,000 0.89(4.21***) 0.88(2.02**) 
Post-act Receivership 632,000 998,000 135,000 289,000 421,000 -0.12(1.07)  
Administration 656,000 1,510,000 69,633 190,000 572,000   
Debt ratio based on estimated market value 
Pre-Act receivership 8.576 24.219 1.715 2.799 6.311 -0.90(-0.48) -0.93(-0.09) 
Post-act Receivership 40.719 215.225 1.944 2.930 6.226 0.76(-1.56*)  
Administration 14.330 64.995 1.849 3.420 6.424   
Secured debt to total debts  
Pre-Act receivership 0.424 0.237 0.237 0.402 0.571 5.68***(5.87***) -2.75**(-2.55**) 
Post-act Receivership 0.569 0.297 0.341 0.618 0.862 6.07***(5.63***)  
Administration 0.261 0.243 0.043 0.228 0.406   
Assets (est market 
value) to secured debt        
Pre-Act receivership 2.689 5.151 0.636 0.938 2.488 -0.54(4.94***) -1.06(-1.23) 
Post-act Receivership 36.087 196.527 0.842 1.162 3.500 1.02(4.26***)  
Administration 3.951 24.112 0.175 0.600 1.363   
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Panel B:  firm characteristics during bankruptcy proceedings 
Variables Mean STD 25% 50% 75% 








Duration (days)        
Pre-Act receivership 626.577 246.965 458.000 602.000 761.000 13.79***(10.55***) 5.67**(5.88***) 
Post-act Receivership 393.487 115.062 310.000 413.000 500.000 2.24**(1.56*)  
Administration 356.815 88.235 339.000 358.000 365.000   
Total realizations (R1), scaled by estimated market value of assets at entry  
Pre-Act receivership 1.025 1.280 0.388 0.746 1.092 -0.45 (-1.98**) -0.54(-1.77**) 
Post-act Receivership 1.157 1.328 0.604 1.006 1.226 0.29(0.86)  
Administration 1.093 1.240 0.560 0.877 1.117   
Total realizations plus net trading surplus (R2), scaled by estimated market value of assets at entry 
Pre-Act receivership 1.028 1.379 0.388 0.705 1.092 -0.68(-2.71**) -0.49(-1.87*) 
Post-act Receivership 1.151 1.325 0.604 1.006 1.222 0.06(0.43)  
Administration 1.137 1.255 0.590 0.925 1.161   
Remuneration, scaled by estimated market value of assets at entry 
Pre-Act receivership 0.197 0.252 0.055 0.114 0.198 -3.39**(-4.05**) 0.88(-0.19) 
Post-act Receivership 0.167 0.147 0.054 0.127 0.268 -4.07*(-2.47**)  
Administration 0.346 0.513 0.091 0.194 0.364   
Total direct costs, scaled by estimated market value of assets at entry 
Pre-Act receivership 0.314 0.356 0.102 0.178 0.362 -3.93**(-4.59**) 0.750(-0.44) 
Post-act Receivership 0.276 0.227 0.105 0.228 0.385 -4.39**(-2.63**)  
Administration 0.564 0.748 0.179 0.347 0.589   
Recovery         
Pre-Act receivership 0.205 0.223 0.032 0.117 0.326 -0.11(-0.60) -2.57(-2.85**) 
Post-act Receivership 0.318 0.243 0.147 0.241 0.448 2.69** (3.26***)  
Administration 0.202 0.237 0.032 0.112 0.282   
Proportion of trade Mean    
Pre-Act receivership 0.349 (38/109)    
Post-act Receivership 0.194  (7/36)    
Administration 0.277 (54/195)    
Proportion of going concern sales  
Pre-Act receivership 0.477 (52/109)    
Post-act Receivership 0.667 (24/36)    
Administration 0.415 (81/195)    








Table 5 Correlations Table   
This table reports Pearson correlations, with p-values are reported in parentheses. REA1 is log of the asset realizations, scaled by size and REA2 is log of asset realizations 
plus net trading surplus, scaled by size; Remuneration is log of remuneration costs, scaled by size and Total direct costs is total direct costs scaled by size. Both 
remuneration fees and direct costs are obtained from ‘receiver’s abstract of receipts and payments’ (under receivership) and ‘administrator’s progress report’ (under 
administration). Direct costs comprises remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc; Recovery is the net difference between asset realizations plus 
net trading sales, and total direct costs divided by total claims. Type takes the value of one in an administration case and zero for pre-act receivership; Trade equals to one 
if the firm continues trading during insolvency proceeding and zero if not; Going concern equals one if the outcome is a going concern sale and zero if not; Duration is 
the log of duration for proceedings; Debt_ratio is the ratio of total claims to the estimated value of total assets.  
 
Variable REA1 REA2 Remu Direct_cost Recovery Type Trade Outcome Du Debt_ratio 
REA1 1.000          
           
REA2 0.981 1.000         
 (0.000)          
Remu 0.739 0.740 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000)         
Total direct 
costs 0.779 0.777 0.935 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Recovery 0.321 0.348 -0.044 -0.052 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.340)       
Type 0.128 0.147 0.197 0.242 -0.007 1.000     
 (0.025) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.910)      
Trade 0.066 0.095 0.111 0.065 0.257 -0.069 1.000    
  (0.225) (0.078) (0.041) (0.233) (0.000) (0.232)     
Going 
concern 0.043 0.016 -0.095 -0.095 0.101 -0.051 0.012 1.000   
 (0.429) (0.764) (0.082) (0.081) (0.064) (0.369) (0.821)    
Duration 0.029 0.000 0.000 -0.043 0.011 -0.605 0.180 0.040 1.000  
 (0.597) (0.999) (0.996) (0.434) (0.843) (0.000) (0.001) (0.454)   
Debt_ratio 0.183 0.181 0.521 0.556 -0.006 0.051 -0.070 -0.103 -0.057 1.000 




Table 6: Determinants of realisations for pre-act receivership and administration 
This table compares the determinants of asset realisations for pre-insolvency act receivership and post-act 
administration, and presents coefficients from regressions with the actual realisations as the dependent variables. 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and administrations 
commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. Realisations are obtained from ‘receiver’s 
abstract of receipts and payments’ (under receivership) and ‘administrator’s progress report’ (under 
administration). We use two measures for realisations. REA1 is log of the asset realizations, scaled by size and 
REA2 is log of asset realizations plus net trading surplus, scaled by size. Type takes the value of one in an 
administration case and zero for pre-act receivership; Trade equals to one if the firm continues trading during 
insolvency proceeding  and zero if not; Outcome equals to one if the outcome is a going concern sale and zero if 
not; Duration is log of the length of the proceeding; Debt_ratio is the ratio of total claims to the estimated value 
of total assets;  Size is log of the estimated value of asset at the beginning of the insolvency; Oversecured equals 
to one if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to insolvency is larger than the face value of secured 
creditors’ claims and zero if not. Industry classifications are based on 1-digit SIC code. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates.  ***,**,* indicates two-sided statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level respectively. 
  Panel A: REA1 Panel B: REA2 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.943*** 0.941*** 0.923*** 0.998*** 0.996*** 0.972*** 
  (10.29) (10.28) (10.10) (10.90) (10.90) (10.70) 
Type + 0.033* 0.035** 0.015 0.039** 0.042** 0.018 
  (1.91) (2.03) (0.76) (2.27) (2.43) (0.90) 
Trade + 0.033** 0.033** 0.032** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
  (3.28) (3.32) (3.17) (4.11) (4.17) (4.03) 
Outcome  0.016 0.016 0.016* 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (1.88) (1.86) (1.89) (1.15) (1.13) (1.19) 
Duration + 0.030** 0.029** 0.033** 0.020 0.019 0.025 
  (2.22) (2.19) (2.48) (1.49) (1.46) (1.84) 
Debt_ratio  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (11.12) (11.03) (11.26) (11.11) (11.01) (11.33) 
Size  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  (-4.72) (-4.38) (-4.30) (-4.69) (-4.29) (-4.22) 
Oversecured   -0.011 -0.035**  -0.015 -0.044*** 
   (-1.23) (-2.45)  (-1.62) (-3.06) 
Oversecured*Type +   0.040**   0.048** 
    (2.15)   (2.62) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  306 306 306 305 305 305 




Table 7: Determinants of direct cost for pre-act receivership and administration 
This table compares the determinants of insolvency costs for pre-insolvency act receivership and post-act 
administration, and presents coefficients from regressions with insolvency costs as the dependent variables. Data 
are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and administrations 
commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. We use two measures for insolvency costs: 
Remuneration, and Total direct costs. Remuneration is log of remuneration costs, scaled by size and Total direct 
costs is total direct costs scaled by size. Both remuneration fees and direct costs are obtained from ‘receiver’s 
abstract of receipts and payments’ (under receivership) and ‘administrator’s progress report’ (under 
administration). Total direct costs comprise remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. 
Type takes the value of one in an administration case and zero for pre-act receivership; Trade equals to one if the 
firm continues trading during insolvency proceeding  and zero if not; Outcome equals to one if the outcome is a 
going concern sale and zero if not; Duration is log of the length of the proceeding; Debt_ratio is the ratio of total 
claims to the estimated value of total assets;  Size is log of the estimated value of asset at the beginning of the 
insolvency; Oversecured equals to one if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to insolvency is larger 
than the face value of secured creditors’ claims and zero if not. Industry classifications are based on 1-digit SIC 
code. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**,* indicates two-sided statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Remuneration Panel B: Total direct costs 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.983*** 0.984*** 0.980*** 1.060*** 1.060*** 1.049*** 
  (11.81) (11.80) (11.68) (13.44) (13.41) (13.22) 
Type + 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.047** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.047** 
  (3.29) (3.21) (2.57) (3.87) (3.89) (2.76) 
Trade + 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
  (6.11) (6.08) (6.02) (5.41) (5.41) (5.31) 
Outcome  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (1.02) (1.03) (1.04) (1.29) (1.28) (1.30) 
Duration + 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.034** 
  (3.42) (3.43) (3.46) (2.79) (2.77) (2.94) 
Debt_ratio  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (8.72) (8.73) (8.72) (9.86) (9.80) (9.90) 
Size  -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
  (-11.80) (-11.64) (-11.57) (-11.82) (-11.47) (-11.39) 
Oversecured   0.005 0.000  -0.003 -0.016 
   (0.62) (0.02)  (-0.39) (-1.28) 
Oversecured*Type    0.008   0.021 
    (0.47)   (1.33) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  302 302 302 304 304 304 
Adjusted R2  0.534 0.533 0.532 0.553 0.551 0.552 
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Table 8: Determinants of asset realisation and cost for pre-act receivership and post-act receivership 
This table compares the determinants of asset realisations and insolvency costs for pre-insolvency act receivership and post-act administration, and presents coefficients from 
regressions with realization costs and insolvency costs as the dependent variables. Data are from pre-act receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 
2003 and post-act receivership commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. We use two measures for realisations. REA1 is log of the asset realizations, 
scaled by size and REA2 is log of asset realizations plus net trading surplus, scaled by size; we use three measures for insolvency costs: Remuneration, Total direct costs and 
Duration. Remuneration is log of remuneration costs, scaled by size and Total direct costs is total direct costs scaled by size. Total direct costs comprise remuneration costs, 
legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. Post takes the value of one for post-act receivership and zero for pre-act receivership; Trade equals to one if the firm continues 
trading during insolvency proceeding;  and zero if not; Outcome equals to one if the outcome is a going concern sale and zero if not; Duration is log of the length of the 
proceeding; Debt_ratio is the ratio of total claims to the estimated value of total assets;  Size is the log of the estimated value of asset at the beginning of the insolvency; 
Oversecured equals to one if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to insolvency is larger than the face value of secured creditors’ claims and zero if not. Industry 
classifications are based on 1-digit SIC code. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**,* indicates two-sided statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
 Panel A: Realization Panel B: Cost 
 REA1 REA2 Remuneration 
Total direct costs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.990*** 0.913*** 1.039*** 0.940*** 1.115*** 1.147*** 1.103*** 1.080*** 
 (6.63) (6.05) (6.96) (6.30) (9.04) (9.00) (9.34) (8.84) 
Post 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.008 -0.012 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.87) (0.76) (0.87) (0.73) (0.25) (-0.35) (0.40) (-0.02) 
Trade 0.059*** 0.057** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 
 (3.41) (3.32) (3.45) (3.41) (5.13) (5.06) (4.74) (4.62) 
Outcome 0.030* 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 (1.97) (1.84) (1.68) (1.58) (0.65) (0.86) (0.92) (0.98) 
Duration 0.026 0.033 0.017 0.026 0.028 0.024 0.031 0.032* 
 (1.27) (1.59) (0.82) (1.27) (1.64) (1.41) (1.89) (1.94) 
Debt_ratio -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-2.85) (-2.92) (-2.88) (-2.99) (0.34) (0.45) (0.61) (0.68) 
Size -0.017** -0.013** -0.016** -0.011 -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.034*** 
 (-2.79) (-2.03) (-2.65) (-1.77) (-7.24) (-7.04) (-7.13) (-6.48) 
Oversecured  -0.039**  -0.050**  0.004  -0.017 
  (-2.25)  (-2.88)  (0.29)  (-1.19) 
Oversecured*Post  0.017  0.024  0.031  0.027 
  (0.51)  (0.73)  (1.07)  (0.97) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149 149 148 148 143 143 145 145 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.169 0.126 0.169 0.341 0.341 0.292 0.290 
 Table 9: Determinants of asset realisation and cost for administration and post-act receivership (Treatment effects) 
This table compares the determinants of asset realisations and insolvency costs for pre-insolvency act receivership and post-act administration, and presents coefficients from the 
treatment effect regression with type as a procedure dummy. The first step for treatment is the Probit regression reported in Panel A and the results for the treatment effect 
regression is in Panel B. Data for both post-act receivership and administration commences between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. Size is the log of the estimated 
value of asset at the beginning of the insolvency; Age is the number of years that the firm has bee incorporated before entering into bankruptcy; Debt_ratio is the ratio of total 
claims to the estimated value of total assets; Prop_secured is proportion of secured debt over total claims; We use two measures for realisations. REA1 is log of the asset 
realizations, scaled by size and REA2 is log of asset realizations plus net trading surplus, scaled by size; we use three measures for insolvency costs: Remuneration, Total direct 
costs and Duration. Remuneration is log of remuneration costs, scaled by size and Total direct costs is total direct costs scaled by size. Total direct costs comprise remuneration 
costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. Type takes the value of one in an administration case and zero for post-act receivership; Trade equals to one if the firm 
continues trading during insolvency proceeding;  and zero if not; Outcome equals to one if the outcome is a going concern sale and zero if not; Duration is log of the length of the 
proceeding; Oversecured equals to one if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to insolvency is larger than the face value of secured creditors’ claims and zero if not. 
Lambda is the inverse-mills ratio. Industry classifications are based on 1-digit SIC code. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**,* indicates two-
sided statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probit regression for firststep Panel B: treatment effect regressions 
   Realization  Cost  
 Type  REA1 REA2 Remuneration Total direct costs 
 Model 1  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 2.537* Intercept 0.989*** 0.992*** 1.029*** 1.031*** 0.923*** 0.923*** 1.035*** 1.032*** 
 (2.46)  (7.12) (7.11) (7.36) (7.34) (10.68) (10.51) (12.31) (12.07) 
Size -0.165 Type 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.021 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.074** 0.071** 
 (-1.86)  (0.43) (0.55) (0.37) (0.51) (3.95) (3.56) (3.02) (2.58) 
Age 0.378** Trade 0.020 0.020 0.031* 0.031* 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (2.63)  (1.46) (1.47) (2.24) (2.25) (5.42) (5.41) (3.94) (3.93) 
Debt_ratio -0.002 Outcome 0.030* 0.030* 0.025* 0.026* 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.42)  (2.46) (2.47) (2.07) (2.08) (0.79) (0.79) (0.10) (0.09) 
Prop_secured -1.859*** Duration 0.048* 0.047* 0.042* 0.041* 0.039** 0.039** 0.029* 0.030* 
 (-4.50)  (2.37) (2.26) (2.07) (1.97) (3.14) (3.08) (2.30) (2.33) 
  Debt_ratio 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
   (2.11) (2.13) (2.00) (2.02) (9.75) (9.73) (11.26) (11.21) 
  Size -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
   (-6.09) (-5.73) (-6.10) (-5.73) (-10.29) (-10.03) (-10.49) (-10.15) 
  Oversecured  0.011  0.007  0.001  -0.005 
    (0.36)  (0.21)  (0.05)  (-0.23) 
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  Oversecured*Post  -0.017  -0.012  -0.000  0.007 
    (-0.52)  (-0.37)  (-0.00)  (0.34) 
  Lambda -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.051*** -0.051** -0.029* -0.030 
   (-0.08) (-0.02) (-0.00) (-0.01) (-3.40) (-2.96) (-2.03) (-1.78) 
Industry dummies Yes Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 233 Observations 232 232 232 232 230 230 230 230 
Adjusted R2 0.245 Wald Chi 75.10*** 75.176*** 72.56*** 72.21*** 425.1*** 370.1*** 468.1*** 418.3*** 
 
 
